MY RESEARCH PAPERS
God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz's Mature Period
In History of Philosophy Quarterly (July 2022)
This paper locates a source of contingency for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking. This paper argues that the supposition that God does otherwise, and creates a sub-optimal world, implies for Leibniz (at least) that God would not be praiseworthy, which is an absurd implication—or a violation of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—but is not, strictly speaking, an inconsistency—or a violation of the principle of contradiction (POC). It is in this sense absolutely possible for God to do otherwise. This paper then defends this source of contingency against the objection that this account of contingency is inconsistent with Leibniz's own understanding of God as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being.
Contingency in Leibniz's Philosophical Theology
In Philosophy Compass (June 2025)
This paper orients the reader to the issue of contingency in Leibniz's philosophical theology. The paper argues that Leibniz's mature 'moral necessity' account of contingency is Leibniz's most promising source of contingency. This is because it accounts for a meaningful sense of contingency while also clearly satisfying Leibniz's own conditions on free action, something other accounts, such as 'per se' and 'infinite analysis,' struggle to accomplish.
Leibniz on Divine Simplicity and Monadic Structure
In Revision
This paper re-constructs Leibniz's account of divine simplicity through an examination of the simplicity of monads in general. Since God is a monad for Leibniz, the simplicity of monads in general ought to apply to the simplicity of God. This paper then argues that Leibniz's account of divine simplicity enables a robust account of divine freedom by securing the possibility of divine choice. Finally, this paper argues that Leibniz's version of divine simplicity, even though it admits some forms of complexity and composition in the divine being, is compatible with many of the original motivations behind the classic doctrine of divine simplicity, including motivations from divine aseity, greatness, and perfection.
Leibniz's Modal Collapse Argument Against Divine Simplicity
With Nathan Dowell. In Progress
In this paper, we develop Leibniz’s version of a modal collapse argument in which strong divine simplicity (DDS) entails not merely that our world necessarily exists, but also that every logically possible world necessarily exists. Leibniz’s key insight is that if God’s intellect and will are identical, which DDS is committed to, then whatever God conceives must also be willed and therefore actualized. We argue that this Leibnizian version of modal collapse has two distinctive implications. First, it highlights that defenders of DDS are rationally committed to a form of theistic modal realism according to which all possible worlds exist, and this raises new theological concerns. Second, certain recent responses to modal collapse arguments, such as Joe Schmid’s appeal to a necessarily existing indeterministic cause, do not address the Leibnizian formulation. Thus, the Leibnizian formulation highlights that modal collapse remains a persistent issue for proponents of DDS.
MY PRESENTATIONS
“Leibniz’s Modal Collapse Argument Against Divine Simplicity” with Nathan Dowell, Carolina Analytic Theology Workshop, Anderson, SC, May 22nd, 2026
"Contingency in Leibniz’s Philosophical Theology” Symposium Session APA Eastern Division, Baltimore, MD, January 2026
“Leibniz on Divine Simplicity and Monadic Structure,” Carolina Analytic Theology Workshop, Wake Forest, NC, June 2025
Comments on Joshua Horn (UW-Stevens Point) "Theodicy and Jurisprudence" Society for the Philosophy of Religion, Hilton Head, SC, March 2024
Comments on Joseph Orttung (Cornell) "Possibility and Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles" APA Pacific Division, Portland, OR, March 2024
“Exploring the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Undergraduate Philosophy Club, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, November 9th, 2022
“God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz’s Mature Period,” Fink Award Ceremony, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, April 22nd, 2022
“How to Understand Counterfactuals Involving God for Leibniz,” Kentucky Philosophical Association (KPA), Morehead State University, Morehead, KY, April 9th, 2022
Comments on Kristen Irwin (Loyola), “Indifference and Universalism: Leibniz on
Religious Toleration,” APA Central Division, Chicago, IL, February 25th, 2022
“God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Leibniz’s Neglected Solution to Necessitarianism,” Leibniz Society of North America (LSNA), University of Illinois at Chicago (Zoom), January 16th, 2021
Comments on Fabio Malfara (UWO), “Malebranche’s Supposed Idealism,” Western E-vent in Early Modern Philosophy, University of Western Ontario (Zoom), June 4th, 2020
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“God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz’s Theodicy” Kentucky Philosophical Association (KPA), Morehead State University, April 4th, 2020 [COVID-19 cancellation]
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Comments on Fabio Malfara (UWO), “Malebranche’s Supposed Idealism”, Princeton Graduate Conference in the History of Philosophy, March 14th, 2020 [COVID-19 cancellation]
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“Leibniz, Adams, and the Necessity of God’s Choice,” guest lecture in Dai Heide, Topics in Epistemology and Metaphysics: Philosophical Theology, Simon Fraser University, July 4th, 2019